Category Archives: Encryption
You need to encrypt all your data. This is how it’s done – TNW
The increasing amount of data were all generating is everywhere: in smartphones, laptops, thumb drives, and dozens of online services. How can we secure all of them against unwarranted access?
We virtually cant.
Smartphones get stolen, thumb drives get lost, email passwords get brute-forced, cloud servers get breached, unwary users get phished, WiFi networks get tapped, and eventually, malicious users obtain access to your data.
So how do you protect your data against unwelcome parties?
You encrypt it. In case you dont know it, encryption is the science of modifying data to prevent intruders from making sense of it. When you encrypt your data, only you and anyone else holding the decryption keys will be able to unlock and read it. This means that even if an attacker gains access to your data by breaking into a server or stealing your hard drive, they wont be able to make sense of it if they dont have the keys.
As Ive argued before, encryption is your last line of defense, the one thing that can protect your data when all else goes wrong.
So without further ado, heres are some of the key ways you can encrypt the data that youre scattering everywhere.
Email has become a de facto medium for exchanges of all sorts. We use email to send business secrets, financial data, personal data and various kinds of sensitive information. There are few things that are as damaging as a hacked email account.
You should obviously do everything you can to protect your email accounts, such as choosing strong passwords or enabling two-factor authentication. But in case your account does get breached, you have a few viable options to encrypt your messages and prevent hackers from actually seeing the contents of your messages.
One is the use of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a tool that adds a layer of encryption to your emails. Basically, PGP generates a public and private encryption key and ties it to your email address. You publish the public key for everyone to see and keep the private key to yourself.
Anyone who wants to send you a confidential message will encrypt it with your public key before sending it to you. Only your private key will be able to decrypt the message, and as long as you keep it safe, you can rest assured that only you will be able to read those messages. This means that even the owner of the server where your emails are stored wont be able to read them.
There are a handful of free PGP tools such as Mailvelope, which work with all major webmail clients such as Gmail and Hotmail, and will get you started with encryption in a couple of easy steps.
Of course, if you want your outgoing messages to be encrypted as well, the recipient needs to have a PGP key too, so youll have to convince your friends to set up PGP accounts.
An alternative to PGP is using an end-to-end encrypted mail service such as ProtonMail or LavaBit. End-to-end encryption makes sure that anything that gets stored in your account is only viewable by you, the person who holds the key. No surveillance or massive databreach will give access to the content of your emails.
The same threats that can out your emails apply to the files you store in cloud services such as Google Drive and Dropbox. Even the biggest services you entrust with your files can get hacked, and the sensitive files youve stored in the cloud can fall into the wrong hands.
The most basic choice is to protect your files with a compression tool that supports encryption and password protection features, like zip, before storing them in your cloud server.
In case you find it too cumbersome to manually encrypt and decrypt your files, you can use tools such as Boxcryptor or Whisply, which integrate with most popular cloud services and add an easy-to-use layer of encryption.
Another alternative is to use an encrypted storage service such as SpiderOak One, Tresorit or Cryptobox, which have end-to-end encryption incorporated into their service. This means only you and whomever you share your files with will have access to the contents.
Messaging apps are perhaps the most popular applications we use on our phones. But theyre not all equally secure. Some applications will encrypt your messages in transition, but not in storage, which means your data can become exposed in case of data breaches or compromised accounts.
The most secure messaging apps are those that have end-to-end encryption features, making messages exclusively visible to the parties taking part in a conversation. Weve discussed how to evaluate messaging apps in terms of security here on The Next Web before.
Some of the viable options include Open Whisper Systems Signal, WhatsApp and Wickr, which are end-to-end encrypted by default. Telegram and Facebook Messenger also have end-to-end encryption, though youll have to enable them manually.
You might also want check out this interesting project by two Canadian students, who are working to add strong encryption to a variety of web communication tools.
While you consider the security of your online data, you shouldnt forget about the devices you physically own. Your phone, laptop, memory cards and flash drives hold quite a lot of sensitive information.
Your smartphone in particular is very vulnerable. It has a lot of functionality, it holds your communication apps and sensitive information and pictures, among others. And you carry it everywhere with you, which means theres a greater chance you might lose it or get it stolen from you.
Fortunately, most desktop and mobile operating systems support full-disk encryption, a feature that will encrypt everything on your phone, computer or flash drive. By enabling full-disk encryption, youll protect your on-device data against physical theft. Good encryption cant be circumvented, even by device manufacturers or government agenciesat least not without spending a huge bunch of money.
Credit: Juan Buis / TNW
In iOS version 8 and later, device encryption is turned on by default if your device has a passcode. Newer Android devices also come with device encryption enabled out of the box, but with the variety of devices available out there, you might want to verify to make sure yours is encrypted.
For your laptops and removable media, depending on which operating system you have, there are always good encryption tools available. Windows has BitLocker, which can easily encrypt your hard drives or removable storage in a few easy clicks. The Mac OS has a native encryption tool as well, called FileVault.
Hackers have many ways to steal your information on the fly, especially if youre using a public WiFi network. In fact, your internet service provider too might be interested in having a look at your internet traffic.
Adding a layer of encryption to your internet traffic will make sure you enjoy full privacy while surfing the web. One of your viable options is to use a Virtual Private Network (VPN). VPN services encrypt all your traffic and redirect them through their own servers. All eavesdroppers will be able to see is a bunch on encrypted data being exchanged between you and your VPN service.
VPN services are available for both mobile devices and desktop computers.
To be fair, VPN is not a perfect solution. Your VPN provider will have full visibility over your non-HTTPS traffic. Free VPN services in particular have a tendency to use customer data for commercial purposes. But its much safer than letting hackers scrutinize your traffic.
Encryption is not a complete security solution and it doesnt obviate the need for basic security measures such as keeping your operating system and software up to date with the latest security patches. And dont forget that encryption is only as secure as you make it, which means you have to keep your keys secure.
But encryption is definitely one of your best friends in the hostile world of digital information, connected devices and online services. Encrypt your data, and stay safe out there.
Read next: 8 reasons why Berlin will outpace London as Europes Silicon Valley
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You need to encrypt all your data. This is how it's done - TNW
Reporters Without Borders: UK Government targeting of encryption after terror attacks is threat to journalism – Press Gazette
Free speech campaign group Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is concerned that Government threats to crack down on encryption technology could make it harder for investigative journalists to keep their sources safe.
Prime Minister Theresa May spoke out about the need to regulate cyberspace after the 3 June London Bridge terror attack.
RSF London bureau chief Rebecca Vincent told Press Gazette: TheresaMays recentcomments about the internetare worrying,especially following Amber Rudds previous remarksthat tools that use end-to-end encryption such as Whatsapp are completely unacceptable'.
RSF is concerned that restrictions on the use of encryption tools might be on the horizon, which iseven more damaging in the light of the vast surveillance powers the government has gained through the Investigatory Powers Act. It is part of a worrying broadertrend of moves to restrict press freedom in the UK.
The Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) was passed by parliament in November 2016 and gives the state widespread powers to conduct electronic surveillance.
Vincent has previouslywarned the IPA could serve as a death sentence for investigative journalism in the UK because it lacks sufficient mechanisms to protect whistleblowers, journalists, and their sources.
She told Press Gazette: This Government is making it harder and harder for journalists to do their jobs, in particular investigative journalists who need to use secure forms of communication. As with the IPA, such measures undermine the ability of journalists to protect their sources and carry out effective investigations into sensitive topics that are in the public interest.
RSF has said it welcomes the Conservative partys manifesto pledge to repeal Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and not to proceed with part two of the Leveson Inquiry. But, Vincent said, RSFwill be monitoring the situation closely to ensure that these pledges are fulfilled.
She also welcomed the fact that repealing the Human Rights Act wont be revisited until after Brexit but reiterated that this is a move which RSF opposes altogether. The HRA currently provides protection for journalists and others by setting out the right to freedom of expression.
One of RSFs major concerns is the proposed Espionage Act set out in a Law Commission proposal published in February.
Vincent said: It doesnt appear to be something they are moving forward with imminently. But we are really alarmed by the idea that such a law could see journalists and bloggers labelled as spies and possibly jailed for up to 14 years for receiving leaked information.
A decision isexpected at the end of the year on whether the Government will proceed with the proposed shake-up of Official Secrets legislation.
Vincent said: We would very much like to see this proposalscrapped. If such legislation had been in place when the Guardians 2013 Snowden revelations came out, the journalists involved in those stories could have been sent to jail.
It would have an immediate chilling effect and restrict the ability of journalists to do their jobs in the UK.
Vincent also said that some of the recent public comments by UK government ministers are a cause for concern, not least because other countries around the world look to the UK to set an example on press freedom and other human rights issues.
She cited the statement from Leader of the House of Commons Andrea Leadsom that journalists should be more patriotic when it comes to covering Brexit and foreign secretary Boris Johnsons recent suggestion that people have had enough about this freedom of speech stuff.
Vincent also said that RSF continues to press the UK government to return the passport of exiled Syrian journalist Zaina Erhaim. It was seized by UK border officials in September at the behest of the Assad regime and has left her at risk, restricting her ability to move around the world freely.
Vincent warned of the precedent it sets for Syrians and other critical journalists and activists travelling to the UK and said it still needs to be addressed.
Overall, she said: The UK fell down the World Press Freedom Index last year and we would like to see it climb back up rather than drop further.
In April this year RSF ranked the UK 40th out of the 180 countries worldwide that it ranks for press freedom.
This piece was produced in association withReporters Without Borderswhich is a sponsor of the British Journalism Awards.
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Reporters Without Borders: UK Government targeting of encryption after terror attacks is threat to journalism - Press Gazette
Five Eyes Unlimited: What A Global Anti-Encryption Regime Could … – EFF
This week, the political heads of the intelligence services of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (the "Five Eyes" alliance) met in Ottawa. The Australian delegation entered the meeting saying publicly that they intended to "thwart the encryption of terrorist messaging." The final communiqu states more diplomatically that "Ministers and Attorneys General [...] noted that encryption can severely undermine public safety efforts by impeding lawful access to the content of communications during investigations into serious crimes, including terrorism. To address these issues, we committed to develop our engagement with communications and technology companies to explore shared solutions."
What might their plan be? Is this yet another attempt to ban encryption? A combined effort to compel ISPs and Internet companies to weaken their secure products? At least one leader of a Five Eyes nation has been talking recently about increasing international engagement with technology companies with a list of laws in her back pocket that are already capable of subverting encryption, and the entire basis of user trust in the Internet.
Exporting Britain's Surveillance Regime
Before she was elevated to the role of Prime Minister by the fallout from Brexit, Theresa May was the author of the UK's Investigatory Powers bill, which spelled out the UK's plans for mass surveillance in a post-Snowden world.
At the unveiling of the bill in 2015, May's officials performed the traditional dance: they stated that they would be looking at controls on encryption, and then stating definitively that their new proposals included "no backdoors".
Sure enough, the word "encryption" does not appear in the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA). That's because it is written so broadly it doesn't need to.
We've covered the IPA before at EFF, but it's worth re-emphasizing some of the powers it grants the British government.
These capabilities alone already go far beyond the Nineties' dreams of a blanket ban on crypto. Under the IPA, the UK claims the theoretical ability to order a company like Apple or Facebook to remove secure communication features from their productswhile being simultaneously prohibited from telling the public about it.
Companies could be prohibited from fixing existing vulnerabilities, or required to introduce new ones in forthcoming products. Even incidental users of communication tech could be commandeered to become spies in her Majesty's Secret Service: those same powers also allow the UK to, say, instruct a chain of coffee shops to use its free WiFi service to deploy British malware on its customers. (And, yes, coffee shops are given by officials as a valid example of a "communications service provider.")
Wouldn't companies push back against such demands? Possibly: but it's a much harder fight to win if it's not just the UK making the demand, but an international coalition of governments putting pressure on them to obey the same powers. This, it seems is what May's government wants next.
The Lowest Common Privacy Denominator
Since the IPA passed, May has repeatedly declared her intent to create a an international agreement on "regulating cyberspace". The difficulty of enforcing many of the theoretical powers of the IPA makes this particularly pressing.
The IPA includes language that makes it clear that the UK expects foreign companies to comply with its secret warrants. Realistically, it's far harder for UK law enforcement to get non-UK technology companies to act as their personal hacking teams. That's one reason why May's government has talked up the IPA as a "global gold standard" for surveillance, and one that they hope other countries will adopt.
In venues like the Five Eyes meeting, we can expect Britain to advocate for others to adopt IPA-like powers. In that, they will be certainly be joined by Australia, whose Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull recently complained in the Australian Parliament that so many tech companies "are based in the United States where a strong libertarian tradition resists Government access to private communications, as the FBI found when Apple would not help unlock the iPhone of the dead San Bernardino terrorist." Turnbull, it seems, would be happy to adopt the compulsory compliance model of the United Kingdom (as would, he implied at the time of the Apple case, would President Trump).
In the meantime, the British authorities can encourage an intermediary step: other governments may be more likely to offer support for a IPA regime if Britain offers to share the results of its new powers with them.
Such information-sharing agreements are the raison d'tre of the Five Eyes alliance, which began as a program to co-ordinate intelligence operations between the Anglo-American countries. That the debate over encryption is now taking place in a forum originally dedicated to intelligence matters is an indicator that the states still see extracting private communications as an intelligence matter.
But hacking and the subversion of tech companies isn't just for spies anymore. The British Act explicitly granted these abilities to conduct "equipment interference" to more than just GCHQ and Britain's other intelligence agencies. Hacking and secret warrants can now be used by, among others, the civilian police force, inland revenue and border controls. The secrecy and dirty tricks that used to be reserved for fighting agents of foreign powers is now available for use against a wide range of potential suspects.
With the Investigatory Powers Bill, the United Kingdom is now a country empowered with a blunt tools of surveillance that have no comparison in U.S. or any other countries' law. But, along with its Five Eyes partners, it is also seen as a moderate, liberal democracy, able to be trusted with access and sharing of confidential data. Similarly, Australia is one of the few countries in the world (and the only one of the Five) to legally compel ISPs to log data on their users. Canada conducts the same meta-data surveillance projects as the United States; New Zealand contributes its mass surveillance data to the shared XKEYSCORE project.
While such data-sharing may be business as usual for the Cold War spies, the risk of such unchecked co-operation have been barely considered by the judicial and legislative branches.
In the world of law enforcement, the UK has for the last year conducted a sustained lobbying campaign in the United States Congress to grant its police forces fast-track access to American tech companies' communications data. The UK would be permitted to seize the contents of Google, Facebook and other companies' customers' inboxes without a U.S. court warrant. In return, the U.S. would gain a reciprocal capability over data held in the U.K.
The danger is that, by forging broad agreements between these five countries, all will end up taking advantage of the lowest privacy standards of each. The United Kingdom will become the source of data obtained through the Investigatory Powers Bill; the United States will launder data taken from UPSTREAM and other programs through the United Kingdom's legal system, and so on.
Secret "Five Eyes" is not the venue for deciding on the future of global surveillance. Intelligence agencies and their secret alliances are no model for oversight and control of the much broader surveillance now being conducted on billions of innocent users of the public Internet. The Investigatory Powers Bill is no "gold standard. Britain's radical new powers shouldn't be exported via the Five Eyes, either through law, or through data-sharing agreements conducted without judicial or legislative oversight.
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Five Eyes Unlimited: What A Global Anti-Encryption Regime Could ... - EFF
Joint Letter to Five Eyes Intelligence Agencies Regarding Encryption … – Human Rights Watch (press release)
To: Senator the Hon. George Brandis Attorney General of Australi
Hon. Christopher Finlayson Attorney General of New Zealand
Hon. Ralph Goodale Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of Canada
Hon. John Kelly United States Secretary of Homeland Security
Rt. Hon. Amber Rudd Secretary of State for the Home Department, United Kingdom
CC: Hon. Peter Dutton, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Australia;
Hon. Ahmed Hussen, Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship, Canada;
Hon. Jeff Sessions, Attorney General for the United States;
Hon. Jody Wilson-Raybould, Minister of Justice and Attorney General, Canada;
Hon. Michael Woodhouse, Minister of Immigration, New Zealand
To Ministers Responsible for the Five Eyes Security Community
In light of public reports about this weeks meeting between officials from your agencies, the undersigned individuals and organizations write to emphasize the importance of national policies that encourage and facilitate the development and use of strong encryption. We call on you to respect the right to use and develop strong encryption and commit to pursuing any additional dialogue in a transparent forum with meaningful public participation.
This weeks Five Eyes meeting (comprised of Ministers from the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia) discussed plans to press technology firms to share encrypted data with security agencies and hopes to achieve a common position on the extent of ... legally imposed obligations on device-makers and social media companies to co-operate.[1] In a Joint Communiqu following the meeting, participants committed to exploring shared solutions to the perceived impediment posed by encryption to investigative objectives.[2]
While the challenges of modern day security are real, such proposals threaten the integrity and security of general purpose communications tools relied upon by international commerce, the free press, governments, human rights advocates, and individuals around the world.
Last year, many of us joined several hundred leading civil society organizations, companies, and prominent individuals calling on world leaders to protect the development of strong cryptography. This protection demands an unequivocal rejection of laws, policies, or other mandates or practicesincluding secret agreements with companiesthat limit access to or undermine encryption and other secure communications tools and technologies.[3]
Today, we reiterate that call with renewed urgency. We ask you to protect the security of your citizens, your economies, and your governments by supporting the development and use of secure communications tools and technologies, by rejecting policies that would prevent or undermine the use of strong encryption, and by urging other world leaders to do the same.
Attempts to engineer backdoors or other deliberate weaknesses into commercially available encryption software, to require that companies preserve the ability to decrypt user data, or to force service providers to design communications tools in ways that allow government interception are both shortsighted and counterproductive. The reality is that there will always be some data sets that are relatively secure from state access. On the other hand, leaders must not lose sight of the fact that even if measures to restrict access to strong encryption are adopted within Five Eyes countries, criminals, terrorists, and malicious government adversaries will simply switch to tools crafted in foreign jurisdictions or accessed through black markets.[4] Meanwhile, innocent individuals will be exposed to needless risk.[5] Law-abiding companies and government agencies will also suffer serious consequences.[6] Ultimately, while legally discouraging encryption might make some useful data available in some instances, it has by no means been established that such steps are necessary or appropriate to achieve modern intelligence objectives.
Notably, government entities around the world, including Europol and representatives in the U.S. Congress, have started to recognize the benefits of encryption and the futility of mandates that would undermine it.[7]
We urge you, as leaders in the global community, to remember that encryption is a critical tool of general use. It is neither the cause nor the enabler of crime or terrorism. As a technology, encryption does far more good than harm. We therefore ask you to prioritize the safety and security of individuals by working to strengthen the integrity of communications and systems. As an initial step we ask that you continue any engagement on this topic in a multi-stakeholder forum that promotes public participation and affirms the protection of human rights.
We look forward to working together toward a more secure future.
Sincerely, 83 civil society organizations and eminent individuals (Listed Below)
Access Now
Advocacy for Principled Action in Government
Amnesty International
Amnesty UK
ARTICLE 19
Australian Privacy Foundation
Big Brother Watch
Blueprint for Free Speech
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA)
Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA)
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE)
Center for Democracy and Techology
Centre for Free Expression, Ryerson University
Chaos Computer Club (CCC)
Constitutional Alliance
Consumer Action
CryptoAustralia
Crypto.Quebec
Defending Rights and Dissent
Demand Progress
Digital Rights Watch
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Electronic Frontiers Australia
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Engine
Equalit.ie
Freedom of the Press Foundation
Friends of Privacy USA
Future Wise
Government Accountability Project
Human Rights Watch
i2Coalition
Index on Censorship
International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG)
Internet NZ
Liberty
Liberty Coalition
Liberty Victoria
Library Freedom Project
My Private Network
New Americas Open Technology Institute
NZ Council for Civil Liberties
OpenMedia
Open Rights Group (ORG)
NEXTLEAP
Niskanen Center
Patient Privacy Rights
PEN International
Privacy International
Privacy Times
Private Internet Access
Restore the Fourth
Reporters Without Borders
Rights Watch (UK)
Riseup Networks
R Street Institute
Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest
Clinic (CIPPIC)
Scottish PEN
Subgraph
Sunlight Foundation
TechFreedom
Tech Liberty
The Tor Project
Voices-Voix
World Privacy Forum
Brian Behlendorf | Executive Director, Hyperledger, at the Linux Foundation
Dr. Paul Bernal | Lecturer in IT, IP and Media Law, UEA Law School
Owen Blacker | Founder and director, Open Rights Group; founder, NO2ID
Thorsten Busch | Lecturer & Senior Research Fellow, University of St. Gallen
Gabriella Coleman | Wolfe Chair in Scientific and Technological Literacy at McGill University
Sasha Costanza-Chock | Associate Professor of Civic Media, MIT
Dave Cox | CEO, Liquid VPN
Ron Deibert | The Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs
Nathan Freitas | Guardian Project
Dan Gillmor | Professor of Practice, Walter Cronkite School of
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Joint Letter to Five Eyes Intelligence Agencies Regarding Encryption ... - Human Rights Watch (press release)
The Encryption Debate Should End Right Now – WIRED
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The Encryption Debate Should End Right Now - WIRED
Calls for strong encryption in ‘Five Eyes’ countries – Radio New Zealand
More than 80 different organisations and individuals from 'Five Eyes' countries are calling for strong encryption in order to protect online privacy and security.
Photo: 123rf
One of the groups involved, Internet NZ, said a ministerial meeting was held in Canada earlier this week between the Five Eyes countries, which include New Zealand, about potential law changes to encryption.
Its deputy chief executive Andrew Cushen said the group has signed an open letter asking government officials to defend strong encryption because it was vital for everyday life, such as through bank transactions and online messages.
He said possible law changes might allow back doors to be built in encryption for officials to look into private information to prevent or stop terrorist threats.
Mr Cushen said while that was important, others could also exploit those backdoors for their own purposes.
"If you want to build some way that people can get in and have a look, but only the good guys, then how can you actually prevent the bad guys from getting in and having a look too?"
The 'Five Eyes' refer to an alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Meanwhile, the American government has warned industrial firms about a hacking campaign targeting the nuclear and energy sectors.
It comes during a week of heavy hacking activity and highlights the power industry's vulnerability to cyber attacks.
Acording to a joint report from the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, hackers have used tainted "phishing" emails to "harvest credentials" to gain access to the networks of their targets snce at least May.
A virus dubbed "NotPetya" this week spread from initial infections in Ukraine to businesses around the globe.
It encrypted data on infected machines, rendering them inoperable and disrupting activity at ports, law firms and factories.
And the energy-industry news site E&E News report that US investigators were looking into cyber intrusions this year at multiple nuclear power generators.
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Calls for strong encryption in 'Five Eyes' countries - Radio New Zealand
Australia Is Latest Country to Come Out for Weaker Encryption … – BestVPN.com (blog)
Australias latest call for creating the means to combat terrorism comes hot on the heels of UK Prime Minister Theresa Mays plea for internet companies to weaken encryption and allow backdoor access. Australian officials have now seemingly joined hands with the UK, one of its Five Eyes cohorts, in this effort.
The Five Eyes nations are comprised of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the US, and the UK. They cooperate closely on intelligence matters and information sharing. With the convening of the Five Eyes conference in Ottawa on the horizon, Australia joins the UK in calling for thwarting the encryption of terrorist messaging.
Internet companies and privacy advocates alike fear that with these two influential members so firmly in the weakening column, others in the group will soon fall into line in the push against strong encryption. This is despite the EU going in the opposite direction. It is as if the EU and the Five Eyes nations are on a collision course, which will only spell trouble for individuals and the internet industry.
These two countries are not alone, however, as the United States FBI has warned repeatedly in the past that impregnable encryption raises the specter of going dark. That posture, along with a national, security-conscious, Republican-controlled Congress, and a President who has signaled willingness to go along with the notion, suggests that the US will cooperate (if indeed not spearhead) the effort to bring internet companies to heel on the issue of encryption.
In doing so, they are tone-deaf to the argument that a weakening of encryption for governments also invites terrorists in the backdoors.
In the point-positions for Australia are its Attorney General, George Brandis, and the countrys top immigration official, Peter Dutton. Brandis remarked,
As Australias priority issue, I will raise the need to address ongoing challenges posed by terrorists and criminals using encryption. These discussions will focus on the need to cooperate with service providers to ensure reasonable assistance is provided to law enforcement and security agencies.
So, increased cooperation among the Five Eyes folks looks to be in the offing.Urging immediate action on the subject of encryption, Brandis noted his reason for urgency:
Within a short number of years, effectively, 100 per cent of communications are going to use encryption. This problem is going to degrade if not destroy our capacity to gather and act upon intelligence unless its addressed.
In the US, James Clapper, the former Director of National Intelligence, appealed to Silicon Valley in what amounts to a plea to address the encryption versus national security issue. He expressed hope that the tech industry could, with its tremendous resources, creativity, and ingenuity, figure out a way to allow government access to communications, while at the same time allowing privacy to prevail.
In March 2016, citingvarious security experts, comedian John Oliverlikened this figure it out approach to being analogous to walking on the sun in other words, impossible.
Thus the situation is presently akin to a Mexican Standoff. Each side is waiting for the other to make the next move or at least blink. The more optimistic folks out there hope that a compromise can somehow be achieved. Some in law enforcement suggest access be allowed in limited, narrow circumstances.
However, even that is perilous, given the leaking sieve that is Washington today, where law enforcement is ensconced. Somehow, criminals and terrorists not to mention corporate advertising interests would find a way in, too.
The EU collectively among the worlds biggest economies is poised to legislate in favor of strong encryption and no backdoors. This is likely to make it more difficult for countries to adopt a cogent strategy that the tech industry would find appealing or compelling. They have consumers worldwide to placate, and an untold market share to protect.
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Australia Is Latest Country to Come Out for Weaker Encryption ... - BestVPN.com (blog)
Encryption cracking campaign receives lacklustre support from Five Eyes – Computerworld Australia
Five Eyes nations' ministers and attorney-generals have committed to develop our engagement with communications and technology companies to explore shared solutions around the encrypted content of communications sent by criminals.
This will be done while upholding cybersecurity and individual rights and freedoms a joint communique issued following two days of talksin Ottawa, Canadanoted.
Despite being a key topic for the Australian government in recent weeks spoken about by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in his security statement to the House of Representative earlier this month, and in numerous TV and radio interviews by Brandis it appears cracking encryption may be less of a priority for the other Five Eyes member nations (the US, UK, New Zealand and Canada).
It was mentioned in just two sentences in the official communique, coming at the very end of the description of topics discussed.
In a press release following the meeting, New Zealand Attorney-General Christopher Finlayson made no mention of the discussion around encryption. The UK governments press release about the meeting focused on urging internet providers to remove terrorist contentonline and made no mention of encryption.
A release from US Attorney Jeff Sessions following the meeting noted that encryption had been a topic of discussion, but was concentrated on preventing radicalisation and human trafficking.
The Canadian government had made no official statement beyond the communique at the time of publication.
Not about creating backdoors
Speaking on ABCs RN Breakfast on Wednesday, Brandis said the nations had agreed to engage with ISPs and device makers to ensure that we secure from them the greatest possible level of cooperation but denied this amounted to forcing them to build backdoors into their products.
What we need is to develop, and what we'll be asking the device makers and the ISPs to agree to, is a series of protocols as to the circumstances to which they will be able to provide voluntary assistance to law enforcement, he said.
We're not specifically asking them to do that [build in backdoors] and its not as simple as that, he added.
Brandis reassurances around backdoors echoes those made by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull earlier this month.
This is not about creating or exploiting back doors, as some privacy advocates continue to say, despite constant reassurance from us, Turnbullsaid. It is about collaboration with and assistance from industry in the pursuit of public safety.
Voluntary solutions
Encrypted communications represent a challenge for governments hoping to thwart terrorist plots and criminals, the communique noted.
Ministers and Attorneys General also noted that encryption can severely undermine public safety efforts by impeding lawful access to the content of communications during investigations into serious crimes, including terrorism, it read.
It is unclear how the Australian government expects ISPs and device-makers to assist in investigations and provide access to encrypted communications without building backdoors into their products.
Brandis said the government will be meeting with the private sector in the coming months to discuss options.
We want to engage with the private sector, to achieve a set of voluntary solutions, he told the ABC.
Brandis said he did not want to resort to the coercive powers which had been legislated by the UK and New Zealand.
Late last year the UK introduced its Investigatory Powers Act,which allows the government to compel communications providers to remove electronic protection appliedto any communications or data.
The governments power to force the removal of encryption, the legislation notes, must be reasonable and practicable; caveats that are yet to be tested.
The so-called Snoopers Charter passed into law in December, but isbeing hamperedby the European Court of Justice which deemed it unlawful.
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Tags backdoorPrime Minister Malcolm TurnbulldecrytionFive eyessecurityForeign policyencryptioncyberAttorney-General George Brandisexploits and vulnerabilities
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Encryption cracking campaign receives lacklustre support from Five Eyes - Computerworld Australia
AlertSec Aims to Make Encryption Security More Accessible – eSecurity Planet
BySean Michael Kerner, Posted June 28, 2017
VIDEO: Ebba Blitz, CEO of AlertSec details what her security company is all about and why encryption on its own isn't enough to keep consumers safe.
Ebba Blitz isn't a typical technology industry CEO and the company she leads isn't a typical security vendor either. Blitz joined AlertSec after a career in journalism in Sweden where she honed her craft of making complex subjects more understandable which is what she's now doing in a different capability with security at AlertSec
"We help small and medium sized companies get the same level of security that larger enterprises normally have, in terms of full-disk encryption and we manage it for them," Blitz said.
Blitz said that some consumers are confused by security, thinking that password protection and security are the same thing. Overall educating both consumers and the market is Blitz's biggest challenge.
Watch the full video interview with Ebba Blitz below:
Sean Michael Kerner is a senior editor at eSecurityPlanet and InternetNews.com. Follow him on Twitter @TechJournalist.
Excerpt from:
AlertSec Aims to Make Encryption Security More Accessible - eSecurity Planet
The battle over encryption and what it means for our privacy – Human Rights Watch
It is a rare law enforcement officer or intelligence agent who doesnt want access to more information. Yet total information awareness, to use a term from the George W. Bush administration era, has never been possible. Some people whisper to avoid prying ears. Others draw the blinds to prevent looking in.
More fundamentally, the right to privacy the personal preserve where governments should not be allowed to snoop is an impediment to official surveillance. That privacy is necessary to safeguard such sensitive matters as our banking information, our medical history, our personal relationships, or our ability to explore unpopular or potentially embarrassing points of view.
Today the battle between law enforcement and privacy is being fought over encryption. One response to Edward Snowdens revelations about the extent of U.S. government surveillance has been growing popular insistence on encryption such as the end-to-end encrypted communications used in iPhones or WhatsApp to which no phone or Internet company holds an access key. Meeting this week in Ottawa, the Five Eyes intelligence sharing partnership Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States is considering an Australian proposal to mandate such a key, or back door, to encryption. Officials in the U.S. and U.K. have made similar proposals.
The rationale is that many terrorists and other criminals are using end-to-end encryption to hide their activities. Even if law enforcement officers or intelligence agents obtain a judicial warrant to monitor their communications, the lack of a back door key means there is no way that phone or Internet companies can let these officers in.
Yet a mandated back door essentially a built-in vulnerability is dangerous because there is no way to ensure that only the good guys will exploit it. Todays hackers, both criminal and governmental, are increasingly sophisticated. They have hacked Internet companies, sensitive infrastructure, even the National Security Agency itself. Technology companies are in a feverish race to enhance privacy and security protections. The last thing they need is to introduce a deliberate vulnerability. Few would want to return to an era when encryption was not the norm.
And to what end? A mandated back door to encryption might enable governments to catch some criminals. But criminals with any degree of sophistication would simply download encryption services that are widely available on the Internet without going through one of the brand-name companies that might be mandated to introduce a back door. Meanwhile, ordinary members of the public would be stuck with vulnerable communications.
Moreover, Western Internet and phone companies would be competitively crippled. Even if Five Eyes and other Western governments mandated a back door for devices made in their country, other countries might not follow suit. Anyone concerned with their privacy and security would flock to and try to sneak in devices produced in non-back-door countries.
The crimes that might be stopped through a back-door mandate must be weighed against the crimes that would be created. The vulnerability in our software and digital devices would mean more theft, blackmail and extortion as hackers enjoy a field day. Street crime would also be affected. The rise of strong default smartphone encryption has contributed to a plummeting in once-rampant cellphone theft. Theres no point in stealing a phone (often violently) if you cant penetrate its encryption. A mandated back door, once its vulnerability has been hacked, would once again expand the market for stolen phones.
Proponents of a back door also tend to assume that law-enforcement or intelligence access to it would require a judicial warrant or some lawful process, but it is easy to imagine circumstances in which these processes would be circumvented or subverted. In many countries where these devices are used, unscrupulous governments or officials in possession of this information would be more likely to persecute dissidents for their private criticisms.
For these reasons, a pantheon of senior security officials think a mandated back door is a bad and dangerous idea. In the United States, these include the past heads of the CIA, the NSA, and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as former president Barack Obamas Presidential Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies. Europol has also warned that solutions that intentionally weaken technical-protection mechanisms to support law enforcement will intrinsically weaken the protection against criminals as well. Security officials would be better off adapting to a world of encryption than to weaken the security of our communications.
Even where end-to-end encryption is used, many types of communication already are subject to judicially-ordered surveillance. Metadata such as the data that guides a communication to the proper destination cannot do its job if it is encrypted. It remains available to government monitoring by appropriate judicial order, although care should be taken to ensure that this data, which can reveal a great deal about our personal life, is not collected excessively. Other metadata can pinpoint where a phone (and presumptively its user) has gone. Much information stored in the cloud is unencrypted.
The plethora of such unencrypted information has led some to say that today is the golden age of surveillance. Rather than press for encryption back doors, governments would be better off teaching investigators how to access important unencrypted sources of information.
Its time to abandon the quest for total information awareness. Yes, some criminals will benefit from encryption. But just as we dont outlaw whispering or drawing the shades, so we should accept that encryption is the only way to safeguard our communications in an era of increasingly sophisticated cybercrime and unauthorized surveillance.
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The battle over encryption and what it means for our privacy - Human Rights Watch