Category Archives: Quantum Computing
Biden Administration Toughens Sanctions, Export Controls in Response to Continued Harmful Activities of the Russian Government – JD Supra
On September 15, 2022, the Biden Administration announced a new package of sanctions and export controls to hold the Russian government accountable for its war against Ukraine. These new measures were implemented by the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce and include new sanctions designations, a prohibition on the provision of quantum computing services to any person in Russia, and enhanced export control restrictions on Russia and Belarus.
U.S. Government Expands Sanctions on Facilitators of Russias Aggression in Ukraine
The Department of the Treasurys Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed blocking sanctions on 2 entities and 22 individuals. The new Specially Designated National (SDN) targets include individuals who have furthered the Russian governments objectives in Ukraine, including some individuals connected to human rights abuses, as well as leaders of key financial institutions, and other entities serving Russias financial market infrastructure.
In addition to the OFAC designations, the State Department also made several designations, primarily targeting Russias defense and high-tech industries as well as certain officials. For example, the State Department designated the Russian electronics manufacturer Limited Liability Company Group of Companies Akvarius (Aquarius), which has been involved in the development of secure smartphones for Russian military and intelligence personnel. Alongside this designation, OFAC issued General License No. 51 to permit the wind down of transactions involving Aquarius (or any entity in which it directly or indirectly 50 percent owns) through 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, October 15, 2022.
OFAC Bans Provision of Quantum Computing Services and Cautions Financial Institutions
OFAC issued a determination pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 14071 prohibiting the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of quantum computing services to any person located in the Russian Federation. This prohibition is designed to cut off Russias access to key services from U.S. companies and is effective October 15, 2022.
OFAC issued guidance with this determination indicating that quantum computing services include any of the following services when related to quantum computing, quantum computers, electronic assemblies thereof, or cryogenic refrigeration systems related to quantum computing: [1] infrastructure, web hosting, or data processing services; [2] custom computer programming services; [3] computer systems integration design services; [4] computer systems and data processing facilities management services; [5] computing infrastructure, data processing services, web hosting services, and related services; [6] repairing computer, computer peripherals, or communication equipment; [7] other computer-related services; [and] [8] services related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of quantum computing, quantum computers, electronic assemblies thereof, or cryogenic refrigeration systems related to quantum computing to any person located in Russia (i.e., an individual who is a citizen or national of the Russian Federation, or an entity organized under the laws of the Russian Federation).
Exceptions to the new ban include any service to an entity located in Russia that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person; and any service in connection with the wind down or divestiture of an entity located in Russia that is not owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a Russian person.
In addition, OFAC issued a determination that Section 1(a)(i) of EO 14024 applies to the quantum computing sector of the Russian Federation economy, and, as a result, OFAC can impose sanctions on any person operating in this sector of the Russian economy.
OFACs quantum computing restrictions complement the new export restrictions on quantum computing hardware, software, and technology summarized below, as well as the State Departments sanctions on Russian companies in the quantum computing space.
Apart from targeting quantum computing services, OFAC also cautioned non-U.S. financial institutions, warning that they could be sanctioned for materially assisting sanctions targets or sanctioned activities, including for entering certain agreements with the National Payment Card System (NSPK), an entity owned by the Central Bank of Russia that operates Russias MIR National Payment System. Any such agreements that expand the use of the MIR National Payment System, which clears and settles payments primarily in Russia, could support evasion of U.S. sanctions and result in an SDN designation.
Commerce Expands Export Controls on Russia and Belarus
In conjunction with the sanctions measures, the Commerce Departments Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a new rule to expand and tighten export controls on Russia and Belarus. These heightened export control restrictions, which took effect September 15, 2022, are intended to further limit access to items that enable Russians military capabilities and sources of revenue that could support Russias military capabilities, thus enhancing the effectiveness of the multilateral sanctions.
First, the rule expands the industry sector sanctions in Section 746.5 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which impose a licensing requirement for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of certain EAR99 items. The rule adds Belarus to the scope of the industry sector sanctions, which formerly only applied to Russia, in an effort to prevent diversion of these items to Russia.
The rule also adds export restrictions on EAR99 items that may support Russias chemical and biological weapons production capabilities, along with items that enable advanced manufacturing. These items are identified in new Supplement No. 6 to Part 746, and examples include: discrete chemicals (identified by Chemical Abstract Numbers or CAS), biologics, fentanyl, precursors, and related equipment such as full face-mask air-purifying and air-supplying respirators, fermenters, reaction vessels, certain laboratory equipment, and nucleic acid synthesizers and assemblers.
Additionally, the new restrictions cover quantum computing and advanced manufacturing hardware, software, and technology. These items are now covered by the Russia/Belarus foreign direct product rule as well, which, prior to this new rule, did not apply to foreign-produced items that would be designated as EAR99 if manufactured in the United States.
Note that BIS previously imposed a license requirement for exports, reexports, and transfers to and within Russia on a broad range of other EAR99 industrial sector inputs and products. The new rule also adds items to this list in Supplement No. 4 of Part 746, which now includes, for example, fork-lift trucks, integrated circuits, and cameras. These controls and licensing requirements also now cover any modified or designed parts, components, accessories, or attachments for the listed equipment, other than fasteners and certain specified minor components. These changes are intended to align the EARs controls with those of U.S. allies.
Second, the rule expands the military end use/end user (MEU) and military-intelligence end use/end user (MIEU) controls applicable to Burma, Belarus, Cambodia, China, Russia, and Venezuela. The rule expands the scope of BISs is informed process authority so that BIS can quickly provide notice to exporters that exports of specified items to an identified party require a license in the interests of U.S. national security or foreign policy.
Notably, the new rule also allows BIS to designate military and military-intelligence end users located worldwide. Entities located outside of the countries directly subject to the MEU/MIEU controls will be specifically identified on BISs MEU List or Entity List, or, in the case of the MIEU controls, in Section 744.22 of the EAR, in an effort to help alleviate diligence burdens on U.S. industry. BIS cautioned that for military and military-intelligence end users located in Burma, Belarus, Cambodia, China, Russia, and Venezuela, exporters are expected to continue conducting due diligence as to whether such entities meet the regulatory definitions of these terms. In other words, even if not specifically listed in the MEU List, for example, the MEU controls continue to apply to entities located in Burma, Belarus, Cambodia, China, Russia, and Venezuela if they develop, produce, maintain, or use military items.
Third, this rule adds dollar value exclusion thresholds for luxury goods identified in Supplement No. 5 to Part 746. As background, in March 2022, BIS implemented restrictions prohibiting, without a license, exports, reexports, and transfers of certain luxury goods to Russia and Belarus, as well as certain Russian and Belarusian oligarchs and malign actors who have been sanctioned under various Russia- and Ukraine-related EOs (regardless of where they are located). The new dollar value thresholds are intended to align U.S. controls with those of U.S. allies.
Fourth, the rule makes several clarifications and corrections to existing export controls on Russia and Belarus. For example, the rule updates the list of items eligible for export to Russia and Belarus under License Exception Consumer Communications Devices (CCD) in Section 740.19 of the EAR, which permits exports of certain communications devices to individuals and non-governmental organizations in Russia, Belarus, and Cuba. Examples of eligible items added to the list include tablets, microphones, speakers, and commercial headphones. To promote the free flow of information, even those items subject to the Russian and Belarusian industry sector sanctions and luxury goods controls discussed above are eligible for License Exception CCD.
The BIS rule also clarifies that the more favorable treatment policy for affiliates of U.S. and allied country entities, including for exports of mass market items to Russia and Belarus as well as eligibility for License Exception ENC, also applies to branch and sales offices of companies headquartered in the United States or a Country Group A:5 or A:6 country. Formerly, such treatment only explicitly applied to separately incorporated subsidiaries and joint ventures.
In addition, BIS added an exclusion to the licensing requirements to permit the movement of an item subject to the EAR within Russia or Belarus for the purposes of returning it to the United States or to a Country Group A:5 or A:6 country, provided the owner retains title to and control of the item while it remains in Russia or Belarus.
The new restrictions build on existing sanctions and export controls on Russia, Belarus, and certain regions of Ukraine. We wrote about those measures in previous Alerts, most recently including: Biden Administration Adds Economic Measures Against Russia During G7 Meeting New Tariffs, Gold Import Restrictions, Sanctions and Export Designations, New U.S. Sanctions and Export Restrictions Target Professional Services and Russias Media, Banking, Defense, and Industrial Sectors, Biden Administration Increases Sanctions, Export Control Restrictions Amid Russias Continued Aggression in Ukraine, Treasury, Commerce Target Russias Tech Sector, Defense Industrial Base.
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Biden Administration Toughens Sanctions, Export Controls in Response to Continued Harmful Activities of the Russian Government - JD Supra
IonQ to Participate in IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering – HPCwire
COLLEGE PARK, Md., Sept. 19, 2022 IonQ, an industry leader in quantum computing, today announced its participation in IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE22). The weeklong event will take place in Broomfield, Colorado, on September 18-23, 2022, and brings together some of the worlds leading quantum researchers, scientists, entrepreneurs, and academics to discuss and explore the latest advancements in the field of quantum.
IonQ co-founder and Chief Scientist Chris Monroe will keynote the event on September 19, where he will summarize the distinct advantages of trapped ion quantum computers in both academic and industrial settings, along with their uses in scientific and commercial applications. Fellow co-founder and Chief Technology Officer Jungsang Kim will also be participating in a workshop program on September 20, focused on constructing control systems for trapped ion quantum computers.
Additional IonQ team members will also be joining a number of workshops and panel discussions throughout the week, exploring topics like working with the Microsoft Azure Quantum Platform, the need for low-level programming to deliver quantum advantage, and the key challenges when scaling towards practical quantum computing. Fellow panelists and workshop participants include researchers and executives from Microsoft, IBM, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and more.
Visit the conference page here to learn more about QCE22, or click here to learn more about IonQs latest updates to its IonQ Aria system.
About IonQ
IonQ is a leader in quantum computing, with a proven track record of innovation and deployment. IonQs current generation quantum computer, IonQ Forte, is the latest in a line of cutting-edge systems, including IonQ Aria, a system that boasts industry-leading 23 algorithmic qubits. Along with record performance, IonQ has defined what it believes is the best path forward to scale. IonQ is the only company with its quantum systems available through the cloud on Amazon Braket, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, as well as through direct API access. IonQ was founded in 2015 by Christopher Monroe and Jungsang Kim based on 25 years of pioneering research.
Source: IonQ
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IonQ to Participate in IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering - HPCwire
Robots & Humans: Are we heading towards Singularity? – INDIAai
Imagine what will happen if we robots can process information, store data and transfer the same at a pace at which humans do, will they not be as good as humans? Just to let you know we will touch on one aspect in this article (Quantum Computing) which takes care of processing information, however there is tremendous progress already made to store information like our DNA and also transmit the same like our nervous system does.
As the smartest creatures on Earth, our journey from the analogue to the digital world has been at a tremendous pace in the past decades.
There was a time, few decades ago, when invention of electronic calculator marked a major breakthrough in the world of technology. The transformational advancements of processing information since then have been remarkable. Undoubtedly, we have come a long way with smartphones, wearable and smart devices, shifting from press the keys to touch, swipe and speak.
With Artificial Intelligence (AI), Virtual Reality (VR), Internet of Things (IoT) and Metaverse being technological realities today, we are also heading towards a new era of data & computation called quantum computing.
Now, Whats That?
Well, quantum computing is a futuristic technology which employs the power of quantum mechanics for solving extremely complex problems that are beyond the capacity of classical computers. To define it simply, this computer-based technology functions around the quantum theory principals where behaviours of matter and energy are studied on the atomic and subatomic levels.
Supercomputers designed on quantum theory consume comparative less energy while operating at an exponentially higher speed.
This quantum computer implements the laws of quantum mechanism for such complex calculation which are much beyond human comprehensions.
Tech titans envision that humans will be accelerated into the future by quantum computing through its impact on data analytics and artificial intelligence. Its massive speed and power shall help us crack even the complex challenges that we, human beings, face.
In the Next Decades, What If I Say That Robots Can Become a Challenge to the Humans?
If thats going to happen, it would be for AI and quantum technology. Scientists have already started to research on bridging the two avenues quantum physics having its strong algorithms and artificial intelligence coupled with autonomous machines. They are investigating the ways to use quantum technology for the advantage of learning robots. So far, the results show that robots can decide faster.
#Case Study:
A team of experimental physicists led by Philip Walther from The University of Vienna collaborated with theoreticians from German Aerospace Center, the Austrian Academy of Sciences and University of Innsbruck. Together, for the first time, they succeeded in proving the increase in actual learning time of a robot. Their experiment included the use of fundamental particles of light, single photons and integrated photonic quantum processor. The researchers implemented learning tasks by using this processor as a robot. The result showed significant reduction in the learning time, compared to the no quantum physics cases.
Hence, artificial intelligence devices that are integrated with quantum computing are capable of self-correction and learning through experience, much like humans.
Sounds interesting?Let me make it more intriguing for you.
As the speed of quantum computing is significantly higher than the traditional machines, this could result in quantum robots if rapid responses are recorded. Such robots are envisioned to be highly advanced and way more sophisticated, with unparalleled capabilities of multitasking. Not just that, but they will also be able to fully examine and adapt to various environments for survival, becoming independently more creative and data processing at a greater speed.
Scientists also opine that the concept of technological singularity will be possible, which signifies machines will be more progressive and smarter than humans.
Upcoming: Robots with Human Intelligence
Yes! You read that right.
Plans are already on to build robots that would share similar values as well as rights like us. They will have the ability to understand the world like humans, have same feelings as well as emotional spectrum. Such human-like technology will profoundly change our relationship with technology and the world around us.
What next?
Remember the movie titled Transcendence? The protagonist uploads his consciousness into quantum computer and outsmarts death! Well, what you might have thought to be unrealistic then may not be so today. Popular predictions say that humans will soon become transhumans through the concept of virtual or digital immortality. We already have quantum computer amongst us, though not a consumer product, but commercially available.
How would this technology make it happen?
Well, going back to its definition again, quantum computers utilise quantum bits or qubits. These tiny physical objects help them cope with highly complex problems and extremely large volumes of data in less than a second. Hence, storing a humans memories and personality would be an effortless job for the quantum computers.
Recent breakthroughs show that narrow AI can perform certain tasks much better than humans. It wont be surprising to say that artificial intelligence will emulate the human skill, i.e. responding to various tasks, and thereby, put our race at a challenge in the future.
Coming back to digital immortality, it is a theoretical concept of transferring and storing an individuals consciousness into a robot, a virtual body or a computer. The required technology with appropriate hardware for this transfer is expected to arrive soon in this decade, although several milestones are needed to be achieved yet.
Digital Immortality: How far are we?
Once a persons consciousness is uploaded, it can be stored in two different ways:
From there, it can easily interact with the physical as well as the virtual worlds. The fascinating result would be that the persons consciousness will remain alive in a virtual space for thousands and thousands of years to come. Thats not all. He can also travel to various virtual worlds and download content for enriched experience. Being still alive, he can work with his own digital clones to accomplish essential jobs in real life faster.
Quite a far future though, the second instance says human beings will possibly grow or build completely new bodies. While models may vary with the type of technology used, the least expensive one could be machine-like or robotic in appearance.
Fast forwarding many decades from today, we might have these machines as highly expensive synthetic bodies similar to the real human bodies using several hi-tech features to enhance their mental and physical capabilities. Moving thousands of years further, the world might have so advanced synthetic bodies that their capabilities would probably exceed our wildest imaginations today. If need be, new versions of these bodies can also come up.
According to the predictions of renowned futurist, Ray Kurzweil, uploading the human mind would be possible in the next quarter century, though perfection might need a lot of time.
In a major breakthrough in research a year ago, one of the most complex organs, eyes of mice, were reprogrammed in a lab. If a human goes blind when older, he/she never recovers the vision. Hence, the experiment was done on one-year old mice using gene therapy where their retinas were turned to be young again. Three out of the four reprogramming factors were implemented. Scientists successfully reversed aging in their retinas taking those backwards to around two months old in age. The mice could clearly see everything again much, like they saw when young. Additionally, the system can be turned on and off whenever required. Scientists confirmed that this can be done with any tissue to reverse aging, not going back too far though.
Probably, the concept of death will vanish in a century or so owing to the dynamic evolution of technology. Humans will just be moving from one body to another, with their memory and consciousness stored in the form of data.
To say so, its just the beginning for us to understand what possibilities artificial intelligence have. Every new and successful experiment, thus, adds to the development of the scope of quantum computing. IBM believes that quantum computing will become the mainstream technology in probably the next 5 years. At this point, can we look back to our mythology and sum up that our culture has been talking about it since eons?
Food for thought:
In simple terms, History for which we dont have documented proof is called Mythology. Do you think we will need to document or even speak 100 years from now? We have already moved from paper documents to speaking in a mic and recording the artefacts, why is it not possible to just transfer thoughts from one person (robot) to another without any speech or text?
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Robots & Humans: Are we heading towards Singularity? - INDIAai
NTT Research Names Takashi Goto Head of Its Technology Promotion Team – HPCwire
SUNNYVALE, Calif., Sept. 19, 2022 NTT Research, Inc., a division of NTT, today announced that it has named Takashi Goto as head of its Technology Promotion Team, a group set up to help productize well-developed research concepts. Mr. Goto was previously a director in the NTT R&D Planning Department and before that a senior manager and senior research engineer at the NTT Information Network Laboratory Group. He joined NTT Research on July 1, 2022, succeeding Dr. Kei Karasawa, who has taken an executive position at NTT R&D in Tokyo.
Mr. Goto will join the executive team at NTT Research, where he will be responsible for exploring the market potential for technologies under development at NTT Research, as well as NTT R&D. One of the first targets for commercialization is attribute-based encryption (ABE), a form of cryptography that allows for sharing data while preserving the data owners privacy.
The mission of NTT Research is to conduct basic research tied to long-term goals, rather than specific product or service roadmaps. Yet along the way, the companys researchers may generate technologies that have market potential. The purpose of the Technology Promotion Team is to test that hypothesis by interacting with a range of stakeholders involved in the commercialization of invented technologies or byproducts. Mr. Gotos task will be to interface with NTT operating companies, potential end users, possible third-party partners and standardization bodies. Technology promotion also involves feasibility studies, use-cases, competitive analysis, proof of concept (POC) demonstrations and related efforts.
We are very pleased to welcome Takashi Goto to our team in Sunnyvale, said Kazuhiro Gomi, NTT Research President and CEO. He is a talented engineer and manager with significant experience at NTT R&D and a keen interest in technology promotion, making him a perfect fit for this important role.
In addition to ABE, other NTT Research-related technologies with potential commercial byproducts include applications of multiparty computation (MPC), another area of research for CIS Lab cryptographers, and implementations of the coherent Ising machine (CIM), a quantum computing-related technology that is an area of focus for the NTT Research Physics & Informatics (PHI) Lab. Supporting Mr. Goto at NTT Research are Mr. Fang Wu, a consultant and technology veteran, formerly with NTT Global Networks, NTT America, Lucent and Bell Labs; and Dr. Yannis Rouselakis, a software architect specializing in cryptographic technologies. To advance NTT Researchs core scientific mission, the company, unique among industrial laboratories, has advanced an open lab vision and over the past three years has established more than 20 relationships with premier research organizations in the U.S., Japan and around the world.
About NTT Research
NTT Research opened its offices in July 2019 as a new Silicon Valley startup to conduct basic research and advance technologies that promote positive change for humankind. Currently, three labs are housed at NTT Research facilities in Sunnyvale: the Physics and Informatics (PHI) Lab, the Cryptography and Information Security (CIS) Lab, and the Medical and Health Informatics (MEI) Lab. The organization aims to upgrade reality in three areas: 1) quantum information, neuroscience and photonics; 2) cryptographic and information security; and 3) medical and health informatics. NTT Research is part of NTT, a global technology and business solutions provider with an annual R&D budget of $3.6 billion.
Source: NTT Research
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NTT Research Names Takashi Goto Head of Its Technology Promotion Team - HPCwire
New Russia Sanctions Imposed as Ukraine War Continues: Expansion of Controls on EAR99 Items and Military End-Uses – Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &…
The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced an expansion of existing export controls and imposition of additional sanctions against the Russian Federation (Russia) and Belarus in response to continued aggression toward Ukraine. Effective September 15, 2022, these actions are intended to "clarify and enhance the effectiveness of U.S. controls and to better align [U.S.] controls on both Russia and Belarus with those implemented by U.S. allies" and "reflect the U.S. Government's position that Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and Belarus's complicity in the invasion, flagrantly violated international law, is contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, and undermines global order, peace, and security."1Among other changes, thisFinal Ruleadds controls on the export of certain EAR99 items to Russia and Belarus, expands the foreign direct product rule to also include certain EAR99 items, and expands controls on exports to military end-users and/or for military end-uses.
Most notably, the Final Rule, "Implementation of Additional Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls," expands the scope of Russian industry sector sanctions that previously controlled the export of items used in oil and gas production to now include the export of certain items that are viewed as potentially useful for Russia's chemical and biological weapons capabilities and Russia's defense-industrial base. These items are listed inSupplement Number 6 to Part 746, and include certain chemicals, biologics, fentanyl and its precursors, and nucleic acid sequencers, as well as quantum computing and advanced manufacturing items. Additionally, 57 new entries of industrial machinery, equipment, and related parts or accessories that could support Russia's defense-industrial base were added toSupplement Number 4 to Part 746. Supplement Number 4 includes, among a variety of other items, certain cameras and industrial robots. Due to concerns about the diversion of items from Belarus to Russia, the Final Rule adds Belarus to the industry sector sanctions that previously applied solely to Russia under 15 CFR 746.5.
Among other changes, the Final Rule also:
Finally, in addition to the new export controls implemented by BIS, OFAC expanded the prohibition onaccounting, trust and corporate formation services, and management consulting sectorsto any person located in the Russian Federation to include aprohibition on providing quantum computing servicesand alsoimposed restrictionson 22 additional officials and two entities in Russia, adding them to the ever-growing list of sanctioned parties in Russia.
We will continue to closely monitor the evolving regulations and welcome you to reach out with any questions. Please feel free to contactJosephine Aiello LeBeau,Mike Casey,Anne Seymour,Jahna Hartwig,Kara Millard, or another member of Wilson Sonsini'snational securitypractice for more information.
[1] Implementation of Additional Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls, 87 Fed. Reg. 57,068 (Sept. 16, 2022) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 732, 734, 736, 740, 744, 746, and 762).
Three Questions About Quantum Computing and Secure Communications – Tufts Now
A radically different type of computing technology under development, known as quantum computing, could in theory decode secure communications and jeopardize military communications, critical infrastructure, and financial transactions, the federal government warns.
The Biden administration recently published a National Security Memorandum about quantum computing that warns of the consequences of development of quantum computers capable of breaking much of the public-key cryptography used on digital systems across the United States and around the world.
The consequences, it says, could jeopardize civilian and military communications, undermine supervisory and control systems for critical infrastructure, and defeat security protocols for most Internet-based financial transactions.
Quantum computers employ a fundamentally different approach to computing than those existing now, using the laws of quantum mechanicsa branch of physics that describes the motion and interaction of subatomic particlesto store information and solve problems that are too complex for current computers.Quantum computers exist currently, but have limited abilities.
Peter Love, a professor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy and the Department of Computer Science, focuses his research on quantum computing. He is part of a major U.S. Department of Energy-funded center called the Quantum Systems Accelerator (QSA), that seeks to create the next generation of quantum computers and apply them to the study of some of the most challenging problems in physics, chemistry, materials science, and more.
Tufts Now talked with him about the National Security Memorandum, and the potential risks to secure communications that quantum computers might pose going forward.
Tufts Now: When do you think such quantum computers might be developed and brought online? Would it start with governments having this capability first?
Peter Love: The sensible view would be that it will be more than a decade before such machines will be availableconservatively, several more decades. Fortunately, there are more interesting, smaller, and more benign applicationsof quantum computing that we can study along the way, as well as other quantum technology such as sensing and communications.
How do quantum computers work so much faster than current computers to be able to decrypt formerly secure communications?
That is a deep, open question in the field. We do not have a good general understanding of how quantum speedup over conventional computers is achieved, and we do not generally understand which problems are amenable to quantum speedup. This should not be surprising,as we do not have a good conceptual picture of quantum mechanics itself in terms of the classical concepts used to define most computationalproblems.
But what we do have is a small number of absolutely stunning examples of the power of quantum computing.
Public key cryptography is used in most secure communications on the internet. It works this way: Suppose I have two large numbers. I multiply them together and tell you the answer. Can you tell me what the two original numbers were? The hardness of that problem guarantees the security of the most widely used public key cryptography system.
Many examples of numbers that cant be factored exist despite large cash prizes being offered. In 1994 Peter Shorthen at Bell Labs, now at MITpublished a quantum algorithm that could factor these large numbers, given a sufficiently large quantum computer. The way this quantum algorithm works is totally unrelated to how the best classical algorithms work.
What can be done to ensure that secure communications are possible when a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer, as it is called in the memorandum, is up and running?
There are problems that can form the basis of cryptographic systems, where we have good reason to believe that quantum computing will not crack them. The federal National Institute of Standards and Technology has recently announced their latest candidates. These will be in use long before a largecryptanalytically relevant quantum computerbecomes available.
However, one must remember that there are presumably large archives of recorded encrypted signals that might be quite interesting to read if one could decrypt them.
Finally, it is important to remember that there is no proof that factoring problems like that used in RSA cryptographic systemscommonly used to secure communicationsis a hard computationalproblem, even for conventional computers. Who knows if advances in numbertheory might lead to an efficient classical factoring algorithm that could render RSA systems useless?
So RSA was never really secure in that very strict sense. Most people believe that RSA is secure because they believe factoring is hard, because they think that number theorists are clever and would have found an algorithm if there was one. But thats not a mathematical proofits just a bet that number theorists are as smart as they think they are.
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Three Questions About Quantum Computing and Secure Communications - Tufts Now
"Once the quantum revolution starts it will be exponential" – CTech
Amir Naveh, CPO & Co-founder of Classiq
Sector: Quantum computing
Founders: Nir Minerbi, Amir Naveh, Dr. Yehuda Naveh
Investors: Entre Capital, Team8, Wing Capital, IN-Venture, Phoenix, HSBC, HPE, NTT, Awz Ventures, OurCrowd
Classical computers can do amazing things, we've seen that in the past 80 years. But some things they're unable to do, explained Amir Naveh, CPO and Co-founder of Classiq. From drug discovery to efficient fertilizer, development, to doing high-performance stuff that computers are not very good at doing. Quantum computers can do all these things, and they can do it with amazing efficiencies All of this is going to happen in the coming few years and in the next 20 years we will see a full-blown revolution."
Classiq has developed a technological solution that enables the development of software for quantum computers which is similar to advanced software development for regular computers. The solution developed by the company is protected by more than 20 patents, and the company's software development platform is considered the most advanced in the world of quantum computing.
Classiq has been selected as one of "Tomorrow's Growth Companies" according to Qumra Capital. This year, for the fourth year in a row, Qumra published its list of the most promising growth companies in Israeli high-tech, naming those who are on the path to becoming the next big thing.
This is, for me, the journey of a lifetime. It is amazing technology, the company is growing really fast I really hope to see this quantum revolution going from a research phase to more actual practical usage applications. Once it starts it will be exponential. It won't be twice as good it will be a thousand times better, a million times better. It's hard to imagine how the world is going to change but I hope in the next decade we will see some amazing things.
You can watch the full interview in the video above.
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"Once the quantum revolution starts it will be exponential" - CTech
Executive Order on Ensuring Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States – The…
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the UnitedStates of America, including section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. 4565) (section 721), and section 301 of title3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section1.Policy. The United States welcomes and supports foreign investment, consistent with the protection of national security. The United States commitment to open investment is a cornerstone of our economic policy and provides the UnitedStates with substantial economic benefits, including the promotion of economic growth, productivity, competitiveness, and job creation, thereby enhancing national security, as the Congress recognized in section 1702(b)(1) of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) (Subtitle A of Title XVII of Public Law 115-232). Someinvestments in the United States by foreign persons, however, present risks to the national security of the UnitedStates, and it is for this reason that the United States maintains a robust foreign investment review process focused on identifying and addressing such risks.
It is important to ensure that the foreign investment review process remains responsive to an evolving national security landscape and the nature of the investments that pose related risks to national security, as the Congress recognized in section 1702(b)(4) of FIRRMA. One factor for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (Committee) to consider, as the Congress highlighted in section1702(c)(1) of FIRRMA, is that national security risks may arise from foreign investments involving a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect United Statesleadership in areas related to national security. Along these lines, I previously underscored in Executive Order 14034 of June 9, 2021 (Protecting Americans Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries), and emphasize in this order the risks presented by foreign adversaries access to data of United Statespersons. With respect to investments directly or indirectly involving foreign adversaries or other countries of special concern, what may otherwise appear to be an economic transaction undertaken for commercial purposes may actually present an unacceptable risk to United States national security due to the legal environment, intentions, or capabilities of the foreign person, including foreign governments, involved in the transaction. It is the policy of the United States Government to continue to respond to these risks as they evolve, including through a robust review of foreign investments in United States businesses.
In light of these risks, this order provides direction to the Committee to ensure that, in reviewing transactions within its jurisdiction (covered transactions), the Committees review remains responsive to evolving national security risks, including by elaborating and expanding on the factors identified in subsections (f)(1)-(10) of section 721. This order shall be implemented consistent with the Committees statutory mandate to determine the effects of each covered transaction reviewed by the Committee on the national security of the UnitedStates.
Sec.2.Elaboration on Existing Statutory Factors.(a) In considering the factors described in subsection (f)(3) of section 721, the Committee shall, taking into account the requirements of national security, consider the following, as appropriate:
(i) It is important to national security that the Committee continues to assess the effect of foreign investment on domestic capacity to meet national security requirements, including those requirements that fall outside of the defense industrial base. Inparticular, the resilience of certain critical United States supply chains may have national security implications. The UnitedStates recognizes the importance of cooperating with its allies and partners to secure supply chains; however, certain foreign investment may undermine supply chain resilience efforts and therefore national security by making the United States vulnerable to future supply disruptions. These vulnerabilities may occur if an investment shifts ownership, rights, or control with respect to certain manufacturing capabilities, services, critical mineral resources, or technologies that are fundamental to national security including because they are critical to United States supply chain resilience to a foreign person who might take actions that threaten to impair the national security of the UnitedStates as a result of the transaction, or to other foreign persons, including foreign governments, to whom the foreign person has commercial, investment, non-economic, or other ties (relevant third-party ties) that might cause the transaction to pose a threat to national security.
(ii) The Committee shall consider, as appropriate, the covered transactions effect on supply chain resilience and security, both within and outside of the defense industrial base, in manufacturing capabilities, services, critical mineral resources, ortechnologies that are fundamental to national security, including: microelectronics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and biomanufacturing, quantum computing, advanced clean energy (such as battery storage and hydrogen), climate adaptation technologies, critical materials (such as lithium and rare earth elements), elements of the agriculture industrial base that have implications for food security, and any other sectors identified in section3(b) or section4(a) of Executive Order 14017 of February 24, 2021 (Americas Supply Chains).
(A) The Committee shall consider, as appropriate, the degree of involvement in the United Statessupply chain by a foreign person who is a party to the covered transaction and who might take actions that threaten to impair the national security of the United States as a result of the transaction, or who might have relevant third-party ties that might cause the transaction to pose such a threat.
(B) The Committee shall consider, as appropriate, the United States capability with respect to manufacturing capabilities, services, critical mineral resources, or technologies, including those described in subsection (a)(ii) of this section; the degree of diversification through alternative suppliers across the supply chain, including suppliers located in allied or partner economies; whether the United States business that is party to the covered transaction supplies, directly or indirectly, the United StatesGovernment, the energy sector industrial base, or the defense industrial base; and the concentration of ownership or control by the foreign person in a given supply chain, among other factors that the Committee determines to be appropriate in considering whether the covered transaction may undermine the resilience and security of supply chains critical to national security.
(b) In considering the factors described in subsection (f)(5) of section 721, the Committee shall, taking into account the requirements of national security, consider the following, as appropriate:
(i) Although foreign investments can in many circumstances help to foster domestic innovation, it is important to protect United States technological leadership by addressing the risks posed by investments by foreign persons who might take actions that threaten to impair the national security of the United States as a result of the transaction, and by addressing whether such persons have relevant third-party ties that might cause the transaction to pose such a threat.
(ii) The Committee shall consider, as appropriate, whether a covered transaction involves manufacturing capabilities, services, critical mineral resources, or technologies that are fundamental to United States technological leadership and therefore national security, such as microelectronics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and biomanufacturing, quantum computing, advanced clean energy, and climate adaptation technologies. The Committee shall also consider, as appropriate, relevant third-party ties that might cause the transaction to threaten to impair the national security of the United States.
(iii) The Committee shall consider, as appropriate, whether a covered transaction could reasonably result in future advancements and applications in technology that could undermine national security.
(iv) The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), in consultation with other members of the Committee, shall periodically publish a list of technology sectors, including those technologies listed in subsection (b)(ii) of this section, that it assesses are fundamental to United States technological leadership in areas relevant to national security. OSTP shall, as appropriate, drawon the findings of other United StatesGovernment efforts to identify technology sectors that are fundamental to United States technological leadership. The Committee shall consider the list described in this subsection, as appropriate.
Sec.3. Additional Factors to be Considered. (a) In addition to the factors identified in subsections (f)(1)-(10) of section721, the Committee shall consider, in reviewing the effects of a covered transaction on the national security of the United States, the following factors relating to aggregate industry investment trends that may have consequences for an individual covered transactions impact on national security:
(i) Incremental investments over time in a sector or technology may cede, part-by-part, domestic development or control in that sector or technology and may give a foreign person who might take actions that threaten to impair the national security of the UnitedStates as a result of the transaction, or their relevant third-party ties that might cause the transaction to pose such a threat, control of or rights in United States businesses in a manner that may result in national security risk. A series of acquisitions in the same, similar, or related United Statesbusinesses involved in activities that are fundamental to national security or on terms that implicate national security may result in a particular covered transaction giving rise to a national security risk when considered in the context of transactions that preceded it. In aggregate, these transactions may facilitate harmful technology transfer in key industries or otherwise harm national security through the cumulative effect of these investments. As the Congress identified in section 1702(c)(2) of FIRRMA, the Committee may consider the cumulative control of, or pattern of recent transactions involving, any one type of critical infrastructure, energy asset, critical material, or critical technology by a foreign government or foreign person in considering national security risks. Contextualizing the Committees review of an individual transaction in light of the aggregate or series of related transactions could reveal national security risks arising from the covered transaction that were not otherwise apparent.
(ii) The Committee shall consider, as appropriate, as part of the Committees review of a covered transaction, the risks arising from the covered transaction in the context of multiple acquisitions or investments in a single sector or in related manufacturing capabilities, services, critical mineral resources, or technologies, by any foreign person who might take actions that threaten to impair the national security of the United States as a result of the transaction, or involving relevant third-party ties that might cause the transaction to pose such a threat.
(iii) The Committee may request, as part of the Committees review of a covered transaction, that the Department of Commerces International Trade Administration provide the Committee an analysis of the industry or industries in which the United States business operates, and the cumulative control of, or pattern of recent transactions by, a foreign person, including, directly or indirectly, a foreign government, in that sector or industry.
(b) In addition to the factors identified in subsections (f)(1)-(10) of section721, the Committee shall consider, in reviewing the effects of a covered transaction on the national security of the United States, the following factors relating to cybersecurity risks resulting from a covered transaction that threaten to impair national security:
(i) It is important for the United States to ensure that foreign investment in United Statesbusinesses does not erode United States cybersecurity. Investments by foreign persons with the capability and intent to conduct cyber intrusions or other malicious cyber-enabled activity such as activity designed to affect the outcome of any election for Federal, State, Tribal, local, or territorial office; the operation ofUnited States critical infrastructure; or the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of United States communications may pose a risk to national security. The Congress, in section 1702(c)(6) of FIRRMA, identified exacerbating or creating new cybersecurity vulnerabilities as a relevant consideration for the Committee when considering national security risks arising from a covered transaction. Review of foreign investment is an important tool as part of broader United States efforts to ensure the cybersecurity of the United States.
(ii) The Committee shall consider, as appropriate, whether a covered transaction may provide a foreign person who might take actions that threaten to impair the national security of the United States as a result of the transaction, or their relevant third-party ties that might cause the transaction to pose such a threat, with direct or indirect access to capabilities or information databases and systems on which threat actors could engage in malicious cyberenabled activities affecting the interests of the United States or United States persons, including:
(A) activity designed to undermine the protection or integrity of data in storage or databases or systems housing sensitive data;
(B) activity designed to interfere with UnitedStates elections, United States critical infrastructure, the defense industrial base, or other cybersecurity national security priorities set forth in ExecutiveOrder 14028 of May 12, 2021 (Improving the Nations Cybersecurity); and
(C) the sabotage of critical energy infrastructure, including smart grids.
(iii) The Committee shall also consider, as appropriate, the cybersecurity posture, practices, capabilities, and access of both the foreign person and the United Statesbusiness that could allow a foreign person who might take actions that threaten to impair the national security of the United States as a result of the transaction, or their relevant third-party ties that might cause the transaction to pose such a threat, to manifest cyber intrusion and other malicious cyber-enabled activity within the United States.
(c) In addition to the factors identified in subsections (f)(1)-(10) of section721, the Committee shall consider, in reviewing the effects of a covered transaction on the national security of the United States, the following factors relating to national security concerns surrounding sensitive data:
(i) Data is an increasingly powerful tool for the surveillance, tracing, tracking, and targeting of individuals or groups of individuals, with potential adverse impacts on national security. In section 1702(c)(5) of FIRRMA, the Congress recognized that the Committee may consider whether a covered transaction may expose, either directly or indirectly, personally identifiable information, genetic information, or other sensitive data of United States citizens to access by a foreign government or foreign person that may exploit that information in a manner that threatens national security. Moreover, advances in technology, combined with access to large data sets, increasingly enable the reidentification or deanonymization of what once was unidentifiable data. Therefore, it is important for the United States Government to stay current with threats posed by advances in such technology, including by considering potential risks posed by foreign persons who might exploit access to certain data on United States persons to target individuals or groups within the United States to the detriment of national security. Accordingly, the Committee shall consider whether foreign investments in United Statesbusinesses that have access to or that store United Statespersons sensitive data, including health and biological data, involve a foreign person who might take actions that threaten to impair the national security of the United States as a result of the transaction, including whether the foreign person might have relevant third-party ties that might cause the transaction to pose such a threat.
(ii) The Committee shall consider, as appropriate, whether a covered transaction involves a United States business that:
(A) has access to United States persons sensitive data, including United States persons health, digital identity, or other biological data and any data that could be identifiable or deanonymized, that could be exploited to distinguish or trace an individuals identity in a manner that threatens national security; or
(B) has access to data on sub-populations in the UnitedStates that could be used by a foreign person to target individuals or groups of individuals in the UnitedStates in a manner that threatens national security.
(iii) The Committee shall also consider, as appropriate, whether a covered transaction involves the transfer of United States persons sensitive data to a foreign person who might take actions that threaten to impair the national security of the United States as a result of the transaction, and whether the foreign person has relevant third-party ties that have sought to exploit such information or have the ability to exploit such information to the detriment of national security, including through the use of commercial or other means.
Sec.4.Periodic Review. Consistent with the policy described in section 1 of this order, it is important for the Committee, on an ongoing basis, to continue to review its processes, practices, and regulations, and to continue to make any updates as needed and appropriate to ensure that the Committees consideration of national security risks remains robust alongside changes to the national security landscape. Accordingly, the Committee shall regularly review its processes, practices, and regulations, and shall periodically provide to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a report documenting the results of its review. The report shall also include any resulting policy recommendations that the Committee considers necessary to meet the evolving set of national security risks.
Sec.5.Definitions. For purposes of this order, terms shall have the same meanings ascribed to them in section721 and regulations promulgated by the Committee under section 721.
Sec.6.General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office ofManagement and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, affect the requirements in section 721 relating to the scope of the Committees jurisdiction.
(d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the UnitedStates, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
THE WHITE HOUSE,September 15, 2022.
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Executive Order on Ensuring Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States - The...
Today’s Headlines and Commentary – Lawfare
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Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Uzbekistan earlier today. Amid political and economic isolation from and rising tensions with the West since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the meeting reportedlysignaled strength in Xi and Putins diplomatic relationship. After the meeting, China released a statement indicating that it was ready to work with Russia in extending strong support to each other on issues concerning their respective core interests.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed legislation on Wednesday to increase U.S. military support for Taiwan amid increased Chinese military pressure on the island. The bipartisan legislation will provide Taiwan with approximately $4.5 billion in security assistance over the course of four years. White House National Security Adviser told reporters that the Biden administration has some concern about elements of the legislation amid Chinas looming threat of an invasion of the island.
Border clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijan forces ended in a ceasefire last night. Both nations lost more than 150 military personnel in the two-day conflict before Armenias Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan, announced the truce. Armenian protestors flocked the nations capital yesterday, condemning Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for his complacency in negotiations and claiming that the prime minister betrayed Armenia to appease Azerbaijan.
President Biden announced that unions representing rail companies and laborers reached a tentative agreement following a series of negotiations amid threats of a strike. Laborers protested the freight and rail companies pay rates and scheduling policies, which previously did not include time off to attend medical appointments without some sort of punishment. A widespread railroad union strike would have likely caused damage to supply chains and transportation infrastructure nationwide. Union members have agreed not to strike while the agreement awaits ratification vote. Negotiations with union members were led by Labor Secretary Martin J. Walsh. The agreement will allow for workers to be able to take time away from work to attend routine and preventative medical, as well as exemptions from attendance policies for hospitalizations and surgical procedures, said the presidents of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen and the Transportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers. President Biden described the deal as big win for America.
Iranian hackers that breached computer systems in the United States, Israel, Russia, and Britain are now facing criminal charges brought on by the United States. The hackers used malware to attack and demand ransom from their targets, which included governments, public sector utilities, and humanitarian organizations. According to the State Department, the three suspects are linked to Irans military, though the attacks are suspected to be independent of the Iranian government. The three hackersMansour Ahmadi, Ahman Khatibi Aghda and Amir Hossein Nickaein Ravarface a number of cyber extortion charges as well as conspiracy to commit fraud using a computer. The men are currently at large.
Mark Meadows, former White House chief of staff, complied with a subpoena issued by the Justice Department earlier this week in its investigation into the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Last year, Meadows sent the House select committee investigating Jan. 6 over 2,000 of his recorded correspondences between the 2020 election and President Joe Bidens inauguration detailing efforts to detect election fraud in compliance with subpoena from the committee. The materials Meadows turned over to the Justice Department this week were the same he submitted upon the select committees request for materials last year.
ICYMI: Yesterday on Lawfare
Jen Patja Howell shared an episode of Rational Security in which Alan Rozenshtein, Quinta Jurecic, Scott Anderson, and Dana Stuster discussed this weeks national security news. The team discussed the recent Russian retreat in Ukraine, Cloudflares decision to stop providing security services to Kiwi Farms, the death of Queen Elizabeth II, and more.
Herb Lin analyzed the threat quantum computing poses to national security. Assuming quantum computing will eventually be able to decrypt the internets most secure encryption algorithms, Lin suggested that governments and entities with secrets form contingency plans in the case of leaks of confidential information.
John Bellinger, Sean Mirski, and Catherine McCarthy examined the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouris dismissal of a series of civil lawsuits filed against the Peoples Republic of China for allegedly causing the coronavirus pandemic.
Howell shared an episode of the Lawfare Podcast in which Tia Sewell sat down with Rupert Stone to discuss the relationship between the Taliban and Afghanistans illicit drug trade.
Email the Roundup Team noteworthy law and security-related articles to include, and follow us on Twitter and Facebook for additional commentary on these issues. Sign up to receive Lawfare in your inbox. Check out relevant job openings on our Job Board.
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Today's Headlines and Commentary - Lawfare
Making more money becomes hard for techies as after Infosys and Wipro, this big IT companys MD says moonlight – Times Now
Mumbai: Moonlighting has become a buzz word of late with IT majors Infosys and Wipro opposing this practice. Infosys even warned its employees that moonlighting could lead to termination of their contracts. Moonlighting is the practice of keeping a second job in addition to regular employment. While it may have come as a boon for many enabling techies to earn an extra income apart from their salaries, it could become hard for the employees of IBM as the company has joined the IT industrys chorus on moonlighting, terming the practice of moonlighting "unethical.
IBM India MD on moonlighting
When people are employed by IBM, they sign an agreement assuring that they would work only for the company. So, notwithstanding what people can do with the rest of their time, it's not ethical to do that. That's my position, Patel underscored at the IBM Think conference in Mumbai on Wednesday.
Quantum computing in India
Patel, in a separate interview with Economic Times later in the day shared that his company had outlined a broad roadmap for the growth of quantum computing in India. The evolution of computing from supercomputers to quantum computing should involve solving real-world problems, he said.
There are four aspects to making this real in any market skilling and training, building ecosystems, looking at the industry and enterprises in terms of identification of real-life use cases and working with the government on regulation and public policy, Patel added.
The Indian Institute of Technology, Madras would join the IBM Quantum Network, making it the first Indian institution to join the over 180-member network of the American technology company, the IT firm had announced earlier this week.
He also reflected upon the talent crunch, sharing that the firm is focusing on expanding its presence across emerging cities (tier 2 and tier 3 cities) to tap talent. Through the pandemic we did see a lot of migration of our professionals to their hometowns. That migration has not reversed completely which is why across the industry we have had to move and accept more of a hybrid work model, Patel said.
WFH at Red Hat
Meanwhile, IBM subsidiary Red Hat will continue to work from home. With Covid still a concern for associates caring for immunocompromised loved ones, no Red Hatter is required to be in an office if they do not wish to return.
Weve expanded the flexibility by offering the majority of our associates the freedom to be office-flex. While some of our tech peers are pulling employees back to the office, we dont think our workforce needs to be in an office to be successful weve seen the value in providing flexibility, Jennifer Dudeck, SVP and chief people officer at Red Hat, said.
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Making more money becomes hard for techies as after Infosys and Wipro, this big IT companys MD says moonlight - Times Now