Cloud Hosting

If the sudden popularity of the encrypted messenger Signal has seemed suspicious to you, you may be onto something the app is at least partially funded through American foreign influence cutouts.

OnJanuary 4, WhatsApp announced sweeping changes to its privacy policies, affecting the vast bulk of its approximately two billion users globally.

The poorly explained rules were interpreted by many as proof that the messaging service was about to commence sharing users private data, including their conversations, with parent company Facebook, and in response millions the world over began flocking to alternative messaging services that offered end-to-end encryption.

The most common destinations for WhatsApp exiles were, and remain, Signal and Telegram. For reasons unclear, while available figures suggest the latter has to datereceived many orders of magnitude more fresh arrivals than the former, corporate news outlets have overwhelminglyfocused on Signals surging intake.

Much of this coverage has been highly approving for instance, The Guardian published a lengthyexplainer on January 24 titled Is it time to leave WhatsApp, and is Signal the answer? The headline was answered very much in the affirmative, to the extent that readers were offered advice on persuading their contacts to likewise make the switch.

The medias damascene conversion to the cause of encrypted communication is rather incongruous. With a few notable exceptions, mainstream reporting on encryption is typically neutral, if not outright condemnatory, the capability frequently framed as purposefully offering sanctuary to philanderers, drug dealers, paedophiles, assassins, and anyone with something sinister to hide in general.

Such perspectives strongly reflect thepublic positions of governments and security services worldwide, to which end-to-end encryption is by definition an extreme detriment, significantly curtailing the monitoring and collection of citizens communications. Privacy advocatescontend authorities oft-expressed anxieties about encryption providing a safe space for criminals and the like are a cynical smokescreen to justify crackdowns on their usage and availability.

Whatever the truth of the matter, efforts to restrict access to end-to-end encryption are demonstrablyongoing, but have predominantly gone largely uncriticized if not outright unremarked upon. Now though, news outlets seem widely gripped by encryption fever.

In a palpable illustration of this abrupt paradigm shift, a mere three days before it effectively urged its readers to install Signal, The Guardianlambasted Facebooks plans to implement end-to-end encryption across all its messaging platforms, on the basis that the move could harm efforts to reduce child exploitation.

Serious discussion of Signals history, and funding sources, has been entirely absent from the deluge of puff pieces on the platform to circulate far and wide in recent weeks an omission perhaps predictable given the centrality of the US national security state to the apps financing, creation and promotion.

Signal waslaunched by now-defunct Open Whisper Systems (OWS) in 2013, brainchild of shadowy tech guru Moxie Marlinspike real name Matthew Rosenfeld. In February 2018, responsibility for managing the app passed to the nonprofit Signal Foundation, launched with $50 million in startup capital provided by billionaire former Facebook higher-up Brian Acton, the Foundations executive chair.

OWS never published financial statements or disclosed the identities of its funders at any point during its operation, although the sums involved in launching and maintaining a messaging platform used by a vast number of people internationally over several years were surely significant.

Rosenfeldalleges the app never [took] VC funding or sought investment at any point during that time, and quite how much money was involved in total is a mystery. Its clear though that at least $2,955,000 wasprovided by the Open Technology Fund (OTF) 2013-2016, and the organizations websiterefers to Signal being originally developed with OTF funding.

The site is also home to a dedicated OWSprofile, which boasts of how the OTF enabled the OWS team to continue providing Signal at no cost around the globe and adapt their operations for a growing user base.

The OTF was created in 2012 as a pilot program of Radio Free Asia (RFA), an asset of US Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which is in turnfunded by US Congress to the tune of $637 million annually inAugust 2018, its then-CEO acknowledged the outlets priorities reflect US national security interests.

RFAs own origins harken back to 1948, whenNational Security Council Directive 10/2 officially authorized the then-newly created Central Intelligence Agency to engage in operations targeted at communist states, including propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, subversion, and assistance to underground resistance movements.

The stationformed a key part of this effort, along with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation From Bolshevism, later Radio Liberty it broadcast unrelenting propaganda in China, North Korea, Vietnam and elsewhere.In2007, the CIAs official website stated these psychological warfare initiatives were among the longest-running and successful covert action campaigns the US ever mounted.

After the CIAs role was made public in the 1970s, Congress took over running and funding the stations, before in 1999 they were grouped along with other state-run media entities under the umbrella of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, USAGMs forerunner.

The launch of the OTF followed the US State Department, then led by Hillary Clinton,pursuing an Internet Freedom policy, ostensibly an effort to develop tools to subvert restrictive internet policies.

However, an extensive June 2011 New York Timesinvestigation pointed to a far darker raison detre, concluding that the endeavor was in fact an effort to deploy shadow internet and mobile phone systems dissidents can use to undermine repressive governments.

Among these assets were State Department-funded stealth wireless networks, which would enable activists to communicate outside the reach of governments in countries like Iran, Syria and Libya.

Reinforcing this conclusion, inFebruary 2015 Jillian York, director of the International Freedom of Expression at the Electronic Frontier Foundation and an OTF advisory board member, stated that she fundamentally believed Internet Freedom was at heart an agenda of regime change.

It may be no coincidence that Signal founder Rosenfeld previously created encrypted communications programs TextSecure and RedPhone, bothfeatured in a March 2013 Gizmodo guide, Which Encryption Apps Are Strong Enough to Help You Take Down a Government?

USAGM is moreover evidently extremely proud of Signal, an officialfactsheet published November 2019 giving the app top-billing in a list of tools supported by OTF. The agency might be, given how popular it has become with dissidents overseas, including those in countries and regions of intense interest to Washington.

For example, Signal became the messaging platform of choice for protesters in Hong Kong after its launch, just as the National Endowment for Democracy, the US government regime-change arm, greatlyincreased its direct and indirect support and promotion of activists and activist groups there.

In an unexpected twist, in June 2020 funding for a number of USAGM projects was unexpectedly frozen,including OTF plans to directly aid protesters in Hong Kong, just as the administrative region prepared to implement a highly controversial and much-contested national security law.

One was the creation of cybersecurity incident response teams to analyze Chinese surveillance techniques in real-time during demonstration, and share relevant information directly with developers of secure communications apps, in order to circumvent crackdowns and restrictions. Another shelved initiative was a $500,000 rapid response fund in support of anyone subject to digital attack by authorities.

Still, the next month Signal became themost-downloaded app in Hong Kong, the apps official Twitter account resultantlyboasting that unlike competitor Telegram, which had just announced it would cease cooperating with authorities requests for user data, we never started turning over user data to HK police.

Theres no suggestion whatsoever that any US security agency had a direct hand in crafting the apps now world-standard encryption system, or plays a day-to-day role running the company. However, the same cant be said of popular internet anonymity browser Tor, which is frequently recommended by privacy advocates in the same breath as Signal.

First developed by US Naval Research Laboratory employees in the mid-1990s, Tor quickly caught the attention of the Defense and Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and since then has been almost entirely funded by US government entities, including thePentagon, to the tune of tens of millions.

Its original purpose was to shield clandestine government operatives from detection in the field, by insulating them from the inherently open nature of the internet, although the potential of Tors anonymizing powers to enable regime change in enemy countries wasnt lost on its funders. Perhaps unsurprisingly, its alsosupported by the OTF, and features alongside Signal in the aforementioned USAGMfactsheet.

In March 2011, Tor developer Mike Perry conceded the browser may unfortunately not provide effective sanctuary from prying governmental eyes.

Extremely well-funded adversaries that are able to observe large portions of the internet can probably break aspects of Tor and may be able to deanonymize users, he said. Though I personally dont believe any adversary can reliably deanonymize all Tor users attacks on anonymity are subtle and cumulative in nature.

Among the most well-funded adversaries of internet privacy are of course the NSA and GCHQ, and classified documents leaked by Edward Snowdenin 2013 revealed the partner agencies devote considerable time and resources to attacking and undermining the service and its users.

However, the papers also indicated the pair were keen not to discourage citizens from using Tor. After all, given that it congregates anyone and everyone with something or other to hide on a single network, surveilling their activities is made all the easier. So does Signal and therein lies the rub.

Think your friends would be interested? Share this story!

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.

Read this article:
Signal, the encrypted messenger of the future, has shady links to US national security interests - RT